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NOTES

ExtraterritorialApplication of Title
VII: The Foreign Compulsion Defense
and Principles of International Comity
ABSTRACT

With an increasingnumber of United States corporations
locating and affiliating overseas and United States citizens
seeking employment with multinational corporations, the
debate over the extraterritorialapplication of United States
discrimination laws has attracted greater international
attention. The 1991 amendment to Title VI1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which prohibits discriminationin employment on
the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin, specifically
The
provides for extraterritorial application of Title Vii.
foreign compulsion defense, however, limits the scope of Title
Vl's application abroadand raises the issue of whether U.S.
corporations can claim this defense when foreign
governments informally compel violations of the Act. This
Note addresses the issues surrounding extraterritorial
application of Title VII and the statutory and practical
limitations imposed by the foreign compulsion defense. It
analyzesproposed standardsfor determiningwhether United
States multinational corporations are liable for violations of
Title VII that are committed to avoid sanctionsfor breaching
informal policies of host nations. This Note concludes that
principles of international comity should shield companies

subject to informal governmental compulsion from liabilityfor
Title VI! violations.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

laws'
discrimination
employment
States
United
2
borders.
national
within
arising
suits
to
only
presumptively apply
However, the increasing number of U.S. corporations locating and
affiliating overseas, coupled with the growing number of U.S.
citizens seeking employment with multinational corporations, has
sparked debate over whether the employment discrimination laws
of the United States apply extraterritorially. 3 Specifically, this
Note discusses the extraterritorial application of Title VII, which
on the basis of race,
prohibits discrimination in employment
4
religion, sex, or national origin.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represents one of the broadest
1.
anti-discrimination provisions of United States law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 &
Supp. mI 1991), as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12112, 12209 (Supp. III
Other employment discrimination laws include: Americans with
1991).
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Supp. II 1990); Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
(1988)); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988); and Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §
621 et seq. (1988)).
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
2.
[hereinafter Aramco] ("We assume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of
the presumption against extraterritoriality."); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949) (holding that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States") (citing Blackmen v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,437 (1932)).
See Debra L.W. Cohn, Note, Equal Employment Opportunity for
3.
Americans Abroad, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1288 & n.5 (1987); see, e.g., Daniel J.
McConville, Relocation FirmsLook Abroad to Jump-Start Stalled Business, CRAIN'S
United States-based
N.Y. BUS., Mar. 29-Apr. 4, 1993, (Magazine), at 29.
relocation companies have experienced substantial growth in the volume of
Id. In the past five years, the largest relocation
international relocations.
consultant company watched its international volume increase from 20% to 30%
of its business. Id. Likewise, international sales for the London division of one
international relocation company increased 53% in one year. Id. The growth in
international relocations stems from regional trade pacts, such as the Treaties of
the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement, which have
caused companies to reassess their manufacturing and distribution tactics. Id.;

Elisa Tinsley, More U.S. Citizens Relocating Abroad, U.S.A. TODAY (Intl Ed.;
Weekend), Oct. 16, 1993, at 7A. The top ten countries to which U.S. executives
relocate most often are: England, Belgium, Australia, France, Mexico, Singapore,
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Hungary. Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) makes it unlawful for an employer:
4.
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
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In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),5 the United

States Supreme Court rejected the extraterritorial application of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1964 Act)6 because the
statute lacked a clear statement of congressional intent to apply
the Act abroad. 7 However, the Court invited Congress to amend
Title VII to apply extraterritorially. 8
Congress accepted the
Court's invitation by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991
Act). 9
The plain language of the 1991 Act provides that the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII apply extraterritorially.10
The scope of Title VII's extraterritorial application is tempered,
however, by the Act's "foreign compulsion defense,"1 1 which
shields an employer from Title VII liability when compliance with
the Act would violate the laws of the employer's host nation. Case
law limits this statutory defense to cases of "actual" foreign
compulsion-conduct mandated by the positive law of the host
nation. 12 Informal compulsion by the host foreign nation is not a
defense to a Title VII violation. 13 Nevertheless, breach of informal
governmental policies, understandings, or agreements can result
in sanctions or otherwise harm relations between the host
14
government and both the employer and the United States.
Consequently, informal compulsion by foreign governments may
undermine compliance with Title VII overseas. In such cases,
extraterritorial application of Title VII should be restricted by
principles of international comity. 15
Part II of this Note traces the debate surrounding the
extraterritorial application of Title VII, including the traditional
inference of extraterritorial intent, the Aramco decision, and the
clear statement of extraterritorial intent in the 1991 Act. Part III
explores the statutory and practical limitations on the scope of

extraterritoriality imposed by the "foreign compulsion defense"
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Id.
5.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 244.
6.
78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447; 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a-h-6).
7.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 259.
8.
Id.
9.
105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601, 120124; 16 U.S.C. § la-5; 29 U.S.C. § 626; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.).
10.
See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
11.
See infranotes 95-96 and accompanying text.
12.
See infra text accompanying note 112.
13.
See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
14.
See infra part lII.A.2.b.
15.
See infra part Ill.B.2.
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and principles of international comity. This Note concludes that
principles of international comity should shield U.S. corporations
from liability when the informal policies of the host nation
effectively compel a Title VII violation.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Jurisdictionto Prescribe
The application of United States law abroad depends upon
congressional exercise of its prescriptive jurisdiction.16
The
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
defines "jurisdiction to prescribe" as "the authority of a state to
make its law applicable to persons or activities."1 7
The
Restatement identifies two bases for exercising prescriptive
jurisdiction relevant to extraterritorial application of United States
law: first, the "effects principle," which recognizes prescriptive
jurisdiction when conduct abroad has a substantial domestic

effect;18 and second, the "nationality principle," which recognizes

prescriptive jurisdiction over activities, interests, status, or
relations of nationals outside of U.S. territory.1 9

Based upon

these two principles, the Supreme Court has upheld
extraterritorialprescriptive jurisdiction over activities that occur
20
outside the territorial bounds of the United States.

16.
"There is . . . a type of jurisdiction' relevant to determining the
extraterritorial reach of a statute; it is known as 'legislative jurisdiction,' or
jurisdiction to prescribe." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891,
2918 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Aramco, 499
U.S. at 253; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 6 (1934); RESrATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 402 (1986)). Id.
17.
RESATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
18.
Restatement (Third) § 402(1)(c) provides that a state has jurisdiction to
prescribe a law with respect to "conduct outside its territory that has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory." The comments to § 402
explain that "a state may exercise jurisdiction based on effects in the state when
the effect or intended effect is substantial and the exercise of jurisdiction is
reasonable under § 403." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 cmt. d. See infra notes 17379 and accompanying text for a discussion of reasonableness under § 403 of the
Restatement (Third).
19.
Restatement (Third) § 402(2) provides that a state has jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to "the activities, interests, status, or relations of its
nationals outside as well as within its territory." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(2).
20.
Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2909 ("[I]t is well established by now that the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect in the United States.") (citations omitted);
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Title VII violations against United States citizens abroad have
a substantial effect on U.S. interests because discriminatory
activity and its consequences are not limited to a corporation's
overseas operations. For example, overseas discrimination may
actually begin in the United States when recruitment for overseas
positions occurs domestically 2
or advancement within a
multinational corporation depends upon foreign service.2 2 Such
activities, although seemingly limited to a corporation's foreign
operations, affect domestic interests by promoting discriminatory
conduct in the United States. 23 Accordingly, Congress may
exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction to prohibit foreign
employment discrimination because the U.S. interest in equality
is substantially affected by foreign conduct. 2 4
Thus,
extraterritorial application of Title VII depends upon whether
Congress chooses to exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction.
To determine whether and to what extent Congress has
exercised extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, 25 courts use
two canons of statutory interpretation. The first canon, the
presumption against extraterritoriality, provides that legislation
presumptively applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States "unless a contrary [congressional] intent
appears."2 6 If a court determines that the presumption against

Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S.
593, 620 (1927) ("Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of
the harm ... .") (citation omitted); Bryant v. International Sch. Servs., 502 F.
Supp. 472, 482 (D. N.J. 1980) ("[I~t is well settled that Congress has the power to
extend the reach of its laws to American citizens outside the geographical

boundaries of the United States.") (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281
(1949)). But see American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356
(1909) ("[Ihe general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the
act is done.").
21.
See Cohn, supranote 3, at 1296 n.51 (citing Abrams v. Baylor College
of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 530-31 (5th Cir. 1986) (U.S. medical school recruited
doctors in Houston to work in Saudi Arabia); EEOC Dec. No. 85-10, 2 Empl. Prac.
Guide (CCH) 6851 (July 16, 1985) (radar air traffic controller position in foreign
state advertised in U.S. professional publication, and company conducted
orientation program, interviews, and selection in the United States).
22.
Cohn, supra note 3, at 1296 & nn.52-53 (citing Watldns v. Scott Paper
Co., 530 F.2d 1159,-1192-93 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976)
(discriminatory practices can prevent employees from gaining experience that
employer deems-necessary to become a supervisor)).
23.
See supranotes 20-2 1.
24.
EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Assn, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (1982)
(stating that the government has a compelling interest in "assuring equal
employment oppbrtunities"); see supranote 18 and accompanying text.
25.
Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2919 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26.
Id. (quoting Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1230 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 285 (1949))).
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extraterritoriality has been rebutted, the second canon-the
Charming Betsy principle-governs the scope of overseas
application: "[A]n act of [C]ongress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
27
remains."
Thus, the first inquiry into extraterritorial application of Title
VII is whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has
been overcome. The presumption against extraterritoriality in
Title VII cases has sparked debate among administrative agencies,
the courts, and Congress.
B. The Debate Over ExtraterritorialApplication of Title VII
Extraterritorial application of Title VII hinges on whether
Prior to the
Congress exercises its prescriptive jurisdiction.
Court's
decision
in
Aramco, courts inferred
Supreme
congressional intent to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction from the
statute and applied Title VII overseas. 28 In 1991, in Aramco, the
Supreme Court held that prescriptive jurisdiction requires a clear
statement of congressional intent and denied extraterritorial
application of Title VII. 2 9 That same year, Congress responded to
the Aramco decision by amending the Civil Rights Act to include a
clear statement of prescriptive intent.3 0
1. The Traditional Approach: Inferred Congressional Intent
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Aramco,3 1 the EEOC,3 2
the Department of Justice,3 3 and lower courts considering the

27.

Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2919 (quoting Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6

U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)).
28.
See, e.g., Bryant v. International Sch. Servs., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D. N.J.
1980); see also infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
29.
Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991).

30.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071,
1077 (1991).
31.
499 U.S. 244 (1991).
32.
See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 85-10, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH)
6851, July 16, 1985.
33.
During a debate to prohibit religious discrimination by U.S. employers

participating in an Arab boycott, Justice Scalia, then Assistant Attorney General,
stated that Title VII applied abroad to prohibit employment discrimination.
DiscriminatoryArab Pressure on U.S. Business: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Trade and Commerce of the House Comm. on InternationalRelations,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1975) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney
General), cited in Cohn, supra note 3, at 1291 n.25. See also ForeignInvestment
and Arab Boycott Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Finance of the,Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong.,
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extraterritorial application of Title VII held that Congress intended
the Act to apply abroad.3
These entities generally inferred
extraterritorial intent from three sources: first, the 1964 Act's
"alien exemption" clause; second, the 1964 Act's broad definitions

of employer, state, and commerce; and finally, courts' deference to
the interpretation of the Act by the Department of Justice and the
EEOC.

Congressional intent to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction was
35
most often inferred from Title VII's "alien exemption" clause.
The alien exemption clause provides that Title VII "shall not apply
to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside
any State."36 The issue then becomes the meaning of "state."
The statute broadly defines "state"3 7 to include any state of the
38
United States, the District of Columbia, and specified territories.
Therefore, the express exemption of aliens employed by domestic
corporations outside "any state" implies that Title VII applies to
citizens of the United States employed by domestic corporations
outside any state. 39 The alien exemption thus allows an inference
that Congress intended Title VII to apply abroad because
providing an exemption for aliens employed abroad would be
4
unnecessary if the statute had no extraterritorial application. 0
Second, the Department of Justice, the EEOC, and lower
courts also inferred extraterritorial intent from the 1964 Act's
definitions of "employer," "commerce," and "state." Title VII
1st Sess. 165 (1975) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General),

cited inAramco, 499 U.S. at 276 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34.
See, e.g., Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir.
1986); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981); Kern v.
Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983); Bryant v. International
Sch. Servs., 502 F. Supp. 472, 483 (D. N.J. 1980) (concluding that Tile VII has
extraterritorial effect).
35.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. See Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F.
Supp. 590, 592 (D. Md. 1986); Bryant v. International Sch. Servs., 502 F. Supp.
472, 482 (D. N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982) (By
negative implication, since Congress explicitly excluded aliens employed outside
of any state, it must have intended to provide relief to non-aliens, ie. American
citizens.... ."); Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 426 n.4
(D. Colo. 1976), affd on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978) ("Since
Congress explicitly excluded aliens employed outside of any state, it must have
intended to provide relief to American citizens employed outside of any state.");
EEOC Decision, supra note 32 (interpreting the "alien exemption" as
congressional intent of extraterritorial application).

36.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.

37.
The statute provides that 'I]he term 'state' includes a State of the
United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American
Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the Canal Zone, and Outer Continental Shelf Lands
defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(i).

38.

Id.

39.

See supranote 35.

40.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
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applies only to employers "engaged in an industry affecting
commerce," 4 1 or "any activity, business, or industry in commerce
or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or
the free flow of commerce ... . 4 2 The Act defines "commerce" as
"trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or
communication among the several States; or between a State and
any place outside thereof."43 As previously noted, "state" is
defined to include any state in the United States, the District of
Therefore, the clause
Columbia, and specified territories."
"between a State and any place outside thereof arguably
to employers
manifests congressional intent to apply Title VII
45
engaged in commerce outside of the United States.
Finally, courts have also deferred to administrative agencies,
which have inferred that Congress intended Title VII to apply
extraterritorially. The EEOC and the Department of Justice, the
two federal agencies primarily responsible for enforcing Title VII,4
both support extraterritorial application. 4 7 The Supreme Court

has

afforded

considerable

deference

to

these

agency

interpretations," thereby bolstering claims for protection from
discriminatory employment practices abroad. Thus, under the
traditional approach, the presumption against extraterritoriality
was rebutted by congressional intent inferred from the statute
and agency interpretations.

41.
Id. § 2000e(b).
42.
Id. § 2000e(h).
43.
Id. § 2000e(g) (emphasis added).
44.
See supra note 37.
Faith I. Michell, Note, The Multinational Corporation and Employment
45.
Discrimina on A StrategyforLitigation,16 U.S.F. L. REV. 491, 503-04 (1982).
Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991) (referring to the EEOC as one of the
46.
two agencies responsible for enforcing Title VII); Cohn, supra note 3, at 1291
n.25.
47.
See supranotes 32-33.
48.
See, e.g., Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 11 ("The court need
not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could
have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would

have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding"); EEOC
v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) ("[T]he EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII, for which it has primary enforcement responsibility,
need not be the best one ....

deference.").

Rather, [it] need only be reasonable to be entitled to
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2. The Clear Statement Rule: Aramco
The Supreme Court departed from the traditional approach of
inferring extraterritorial intent, however, in Aramco.4 9 In Aramco,
the Court declined to apply Title VII to employment discrimination'
against United States citizens employed abroad by U.S.
corporations. 50 The Court imported the clear statement rule51
into the traditional presumption
against extraterritorial
application,5 2 holding that inferences of congressional intent are
insufficient to mandate compliance with Title VII abroad.5
In Aramco, Ali Boureslan, a naturalized United States citizen
born in Lebanon, initiated suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas against Aramco, his former

employer.5 4 The complaint alleged discrimination based on race,
religion, and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 5 5 The district court dismissed the suit for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the language and
legislative history of the Act did not manifest congressional intent
to apply the Act extraterritorially.5 6 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. 5 7
On writ of certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court held that Title VII did not apply to discrimination
against U.S. citizens employed in foreign operations of U.S.
58
corporations.
The majority considered only one issue: whether evidence of
congressional intent to apply the Act extraterritorially could
49.
499 U.S. 244 (1991).
50.
Id. at 259.
51.
The clear statement rule
requiring congressional intent to
disavowing reliance on legislative
inferences from statutory language.
A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOIRE DAME L.

is a strict standard of statutory interpretation
be plainly expressed in the statute, and
history, administrative interpretations, and
Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misinterpretations:
Rev. 1095, 1102 (1993). Prior to the Aramco

decision, the clear statement rule was used only "to interpret statutes that
implicated the structure of our government as delineated by the constitution." The
Supreme Court-LeadingCases: Civil Rights Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 369, 374-76
(1991). The Supreme Court departed from precedent by expanding the application

of the rule, which threatened to undermine congressional intent and to cause
statutory amendment. Id.
52.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
53.
Id. at 258-59.
54.
Id. at 247-48.
55.
Id. at 248. Plaintiff, Ali Boureslan, was employed by Aramco Services
Company as an engineer in El Paso, Texas. Plaintiff was transferred to work for

Aramco in Saudi Arabia, where his supervisor allegedly harassed him about his
national origin, religion, and race. Plaintiff's performance deteriorated, and his
employment was terminated. Plaintiff then initiated a Title VII action against his
employer. Boureslan v. Aramco, 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987).

56.

Id.

57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 259.
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overcome the traditional presumption against extraterritoriality. 5 9

The Court strictly construed the presumption, holding that it is
rebutted only when a contrary intent is "clearly expressed." 60 The
Court then rejected inferences of congressional intent, stating

that "[i]f we were to

or even plausible

permit possible,

interpretations of [statutory] language

.

.

.

to override

the

application, there would be
presumption against extraterritorial
6
little left of the presumption." 1
The Court explicitly rejected the EEOC's claim that Title VII
applied extraterritorially.6 2 The EEOC advanced the traditional
arguments6 3 for inferring congressional intent: first, that the
statutory definitions of "employer" and "commerce" manifested the
requisite congressional intent, and second, that the Court itself
found the agency's reading "plausible."" While the Court also
found Aramco's contrary reading "plausible," it declined to choose
between the competing interpretations.6 5 The Court reasoned
that the language relied upon by the EEOC was "ambiguous" and
"deduced by inference from boilerplate language,""6 thus falling
short of the "affirmative showing" of contrary intent required for
67
extraterritorial application.
The Court explicitly rejected the "alien exemption" language
as evidence of congressional intent.6 8 The EEOC maintained that
"Congress could not rationally have enacted an exemption for the
employment of aliens abroad if it intended to foreclose all
potential extraterritorial applications of the statute."6 9 Aramco,
on the other hand, offered two alternative readings of the
exemption provision: either the phrase "outside any state" refers

only to U.S. possessions, 70 or the alien exemption provision

59.
In a 6-3 opinion, Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court. Justice Scalia concurred in
the judgment. Id. at 244.

60.
61.

Id. at 248.
Id. at 254.

62.
63.
64.

Id. at 249.
Id.
Id.

65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 250-51.

67.
Id. at 250. According to the Aramco decision, the "affirmative showing"
of contrary congressional intent may not be inferred from statutory language or
agency interpretation, but rather requires a "clear statement" that a statute
applies overseas. Id. at 258. At least one later decision by a circuit court of
appeals questions the "clear statement" requirement. See infranote 94.
68.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 255.
69.
Id. at 253 (emphasis in original).
70.
Aramco argued that the "outside any state" clause "means outside any
state, but within the control of the United States." Aramco, 499 U.S. at 253.
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merely confirms that aliens employed within the United States are
protected by the statute.7 1 Again, the Supreme Court declined to
endorse either interpretation, but noted that using the alien
exemption provision to apply the statute overseas would subject
not only U.S. corporations, but also foreign employers, to Title
VII. 7 2 For example, according to the Court, under this analysis
Title VII would apply not only to a U.S. employer of U.S. citizens
in France, but also to a French employer of U.S. citizens in
France.7 3 Because subjecting foreign employers to Title VII would
invite conflict with foreign laws, the Court declined to apply the
statute extraterritorially
"[w]ithout clearer
evidence
of
congressional intent... than is contained in the alien-exemption
clause.. .. ."74

Furthermore, the court in Aramco noted that Title VII lacks
the elements that ordinarily suggest extraterritorial application.
Specifically, the majority found that Title VII fails to address
conflicts with foreign laws and procedures.7 5 Thus, the absence
of language addressing such conflicts indicates that Congress did
not intend the Act to interfere with the sovereignty of any other
state.7 6 Therefore,
according to the Court, Title VII has a 'purely
77
domestic focus."
Finally, the Court declined to defer to administrative
interpretation of the statute.
The Court found the EEOC
interpretation of the statute neither contemporaneous with the
statute's enactment"
nor consistent with earlier EEOC
pronouncements on the issue, 7 9 and therefore unworthy of

71.

Id. at 254.

72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.

Id. at 255.

75.
Id.
76.
Id. The Court cites 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(d), 2000e-7, and 2000h-4 as
examples of the statute's provisions protecting state sovereignty. Aramco, 499
U.S. at 255. Each section generally provides that Title VII shall not be construed
to invalidate state law, or exclude or affect the application of state or local law
unless inconsistent with the purposes of Title VII or otherwise unlawful under
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(d), 2000e-5(d), 2000e-7, 2000h-4 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
77.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 255.
78.
IM. at 257. The Court noted that the EEOC interpretation of the

statute was "not expressly reflected in its policy guidelines until some 24 years
after the passage of the statute." Id.
79.
I. The Court cited 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(c) (1971) ("Title VII... protects
all individuals, both citizens and noncitizens, domiciled or residing in the United

States, against discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin") as evidence that the EEOC interpretation of the statute was inconsistent
with its earlier pronouncements. The dissent took issue with this claim. See
infranotes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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deference. 8 0 The Court concluded that Title VII did not apply
extraterritorially because Congress is well aware of "the need to
make a clear statement that a statute applies overseas,"8 1 and yet
failed to do so. The Court invited Congress to amend the statute
82
to apply extraterritorially.
In a concurrence, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's
holding regarding deference to agency interpretations. Scalia
maintained that "the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous
83
language need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference."
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia would not have deferred to the EEOC
in this case because it is unreasonable to allow inferences from
vague statutory language to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality.8 4 Justice Scalia advocated limited judicial
deference to agency interpretations, stating that "deference is not
abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency
interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of
construction courts normally employ."85 Because the court
normally employs a presumption against extraterritoriality and
Aramco requires a clear statement of congressional intent to
overcome this presumption, Justice Scalia maintained that the
EEOC interpretation was not reasonable.8 6 Therefore, he declined
to defer to the EEOC interpretation.
80.
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976)
(addressing the proper deference afforded EEOC guidelines). According to
standards set forth in that case, "the level of deference afforded 'vill depend upon
the thoroughness evident in [the Agency's] consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Aramco, 499
U.S. at 257 (quoting Gilbert,429 U.S. at 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
81.
499 U.S. at 257. The Court found evidence that Congress was aware
of the need to make a clear statement of extraterritorial intent in the numerous
statutes that contain such a clear statement. The Court cites the Exportation
Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2515(2); Coast Guard Act, 14 U.S.C.
§ 89(a); Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. § 5001(5)(A); and
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630() (quotations omitted).
Id. at 258.
82.
Id. at 259.
83.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting EEOC v. Commercial Office
Products, 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988)). Justice Scalia stated that the majority's

reliance on General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) is misplaced. The
holding in Gilbert refers only to EEOC guidelines, which are afforded limited
deference because the agency lacks explicit rulemaking power. Deference to
EEOC interpretations is governed by Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(requiring only that the interpretation be reasonable to be afforded deference).
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 259-60 (Scalia, J. concurring).
84.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring).
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
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Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
dissented. Stating that the majority improperly transformed the
presumption against extraterritoriality into a "clear statement"
rule,8 7 the dissent relied on traditional rules of statutory
interpretation to reach the conclusion that Congress intended
Title VII to apply overseas. 88 Based on the statutory language
and legislative history, the dissent concluded that the alien
exemption provision sufficiently rebuts the presumption against
extraterritorial application. 8 9 The dissent further reasoned that

the EEOC interpretation of the statute, was consistent with its
earlier pronouncements on the issue, and therefore should be
90
afforded deference.
The Aramco decision temporarily settled the debate over
extraterritorial application of Title VII.
However, Congress
accepted the Supreme Court's invitation to amend the statute by
adding a "clear statement" of extraterritorial intent in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
3. Making a Clear Statement of Extraterritorial Intent:
Rights Act of 1991

The Civil

The Civil Rights Act of 199191 expands the scope of Title VII
protection to include U.S. citizens employed by U.S. corporations
operating abroad.
These amendments to Title VII effectively
overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Aramco, which barred
the extraterritorial application of Title VII for lack of a clear
statement of congressional intent.9
Section 109(a) of the 1991 Act amends the definition of
"employee" to read: "With respect to employment in a foreign
country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the
United States."9 3 This broader definition of employee satisfies the

87.
See supra note 51.
88.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 261 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89.
Id. at 266-70. The dissenters first noted that the statutory definitions
of the terms "employer" and "commerce" were not limited to the territory of the
United States. Id. at 266. They then reasoned that the existence of an alien
exemption provision is proof that Congress contemplated extraterritorial
application of Title VII. Id. Finally, the dissent noted that reference was made to
extraterritorial application before a Senate subcommittee working on an early
version of the bill. Id. at 269.
90.
Id. at 274-78. "Since 1975, the EEOC has been on record as
construing Title VII to apply to United States companies employing United States
citizens abroad." Id. at 275.
91.
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Act].
92.
David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991,
C779 ALI-ABA 639, 677 (Dec. 3, 1992).
93.
1991 Act, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (1991).

1994]

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF TITLE VII

883

clear statement required by the Supreme Court in Aramco.9 4 The

expanded protection for U.S. citizens abroad is limited, however,
by the "foreign compulsion defense. "9 5 This defense protects U.S.
employers from Title VII liability when compliance with the
statute would require the employer "to violate the law of the
foreign country in which such workplace is located. " 9 6 The
foreign compulsion defense bars Title VII liability if a U.S.

employer can prove that the positive law of the host country
mandates the alleged discriminatory activity. 9 7 The statute fails
to distinguish between customs and laws for purposes of the

defense, 9 8 and does not provide any guidance for federal courts
attempting to differentiate between them. 9 9 Statutory silence
with regard to this distinction has resulted in debate over the
scope of the foreign compulsion defense.

94.

Notwithstanding the Aramco decision, at least one circuit court of

appeals has held that extraterritorial application of a statute does not require a
clear statement of congressional intent. In Kollias v. DAG Marine Maintenance,
29 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Aranco decision did not require a clear statement of extraterritorial intent, but
rather "sufficiently clear indicia of congressional intent." The court held that a
true "clear statement" rule would preclude consideration of legislative history,
administrative interpretations, and other extrinsic indicia of congressional intent.
The court reasoned that because the Aramco decision considered all of these
factors, the Court could not have intended to require a clear statement to
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at 73.
The Second Circuit then considered statutory language, congressional
purpose in enacting the statute, legislative history, and administrative
interpretation to conclude that Congress intended the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) to apply abroad. Id. at 73-75. This decision
casts doubt on the clear statement rule that seems to be imposed by the Supreme
Court in Aramco. See also Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2562
(1993) (cited in Koflas as holding that "all available evidence" may be considered
in determining extraterritorial intent). But see Gushi Bros. Co. v. Bank of Guam,
28 F.3d 1535 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Aramco methodology is conclusive
and denying extraterritorial application in the absence of an express statement of
congressional intent beyond a statute's "boiler plate" and generic language).
95.
1991 Act, §§ 109(b)(1)(b), 109(b)(2)(b).
96.
1991 Act, § 109(b). Section 109(b) provides:
It shall not be unlawful under section 703 or 704 [of the Civil Rights Act of
i964] for an employer (or a corporation controlled by an employer) ... to
take any action otherwise prohibited by such section, with respect to an
employee in a workplace in a foreign country if compliance with such
section would cause such employer (or such corporation) ... to violate the
law of the foreign country in which such workplace is located.

Id
97.

Id.; see also part llI.A.2.a. (discussing the need to show "actual" foreign

compulsion by the positive law of the host nation).
98.
99.

Cathcart & Snyderman, supranote 92, at 677.
Id.
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III. SCOPE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF TITLE VII
The general presumption against extraterritorial application
is rebutted for Title VII by the 1991 Act's inclusion of a clear
statement of congressional intent to apply the statute to U.S.
corporations operating abroad. Once the presumption against
extraterritoriality has been rebutted, the CharmingBetsy principle
applies to limit the scope of extraterritorial application of U.S.
law.100 This principle provides that "an act of [Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains."1 0 1 Title VII avoids violating the
law of nations by restricting the scope of its extraterritorial reach
with the statutory foreign compulsion defense. 102 This statutory
defense is limited, however, and leaves open the possibility that

compliance with Title VII will conflict with the laws of foreign
states. Therefore, the scope of the Act must be further limited by
principles of international comity.
A. Statutory Limitations on the Scope of Extraterritoriality:
the Foreign Compulsion Defense
The Act itself limits the extraterritorial application of Title VII
through the foreign compulsion defense.103 This defense exempts
U.S. employers from liability under the Act when foreign law
compels the allegedly discriminatory conduct.1 ° 4 The foreign
compulsion principle arose as a theoretical defense to antitrust
liability, 10 5 and an examination of antitrust case law reveals the
narrow construction of the defense.
1. The Foreign Compulsion Defense in Antitrust Cases
In Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texas Maracaibo,1°6 the
defendant successfully invoked the foreign compulsion defense
against a claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act. 10 7
In
Maracaibo, the plaintiff alleged that defendants violated the
Sherman Act by refusing to supply them with low-cost

100.
101.

See supranote 27 and accompanying text
Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2919 (quoting Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6

U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)).
102. See supranote 96.
103. Id.
104.
105.

Id.
Michael A. Warner, Jr., Comment, Strangers In a Strange Land:

Foreign Compulsion and the ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Employment
Law, 11 NW. J. INr'LL. & BUS. 371, 374 (1990).
106.
107.

307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1987).
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Venezuelan crude oil. 1 08 The defendants argued that although
they had violated the Sherman Act, they should escape liability
because the violation was compelled by the Venezuelan
government.109 The district court found the claim of foreign
compulsion supported by undisputed facts," 0 and held that such
compulsion functioned as a complete defense to liability under the
Sherman Act."' The court limited the defense, however, to cases
of "actual" governmental compulsion, stating that "knowledge,
acquiescence, approval, or even encouragement of the illegal
activity by the host government does not excuse an anti-trust
violation."" 2
The court failed to articulate standards for
3
determining what constitutes "actual" foreign compulsion."
2. The Foreign Compulsion Defense in Employment
Discrimination Cases
Employment discrimination cases have similarly limited the
In Abrams v. Baylor College of
foreign compulsion defense.
4
Medicine,"
a medical school barred two doctors from
participating in the school's program in Saudi Arabia because
they were Jewish."1 5 In an action under Title VII, the defendant
medical school argued that the Saudi Arabian government

compelled them to discriminate against the doctors on the basis

of their religion. 1 16 The court recognized the foreign compulsion
defense, but declined to apply it because the court found no
evidence of actual compulsion." 7 The school officials could not
claim that their discriminatory conduct was compelled by foreign
law because they took no affirmative steps to ascertain the official
position of the Saudi government. 1 8 This case illustrates that a

108.
109.

307 F. Supp. at 1294.
Id.
110. Id. at 1296 ("The [c]ourt concludes . . . that the undisputed facts
demonstrate that defendants were compelled by regulatory authorities in
Venezuela to boycott plaintiff.").
111. Id. (stating that "compulsion is a complete defense").
112.

Warner, supra note 105, at 375.

113. Id.
114. 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986).
115. Id. at531n.3.
116. Id. at 533.
117. Id. at 535.
118. Id. In dicta, the Baylor court indicates a slightly less stringent
standard than the one articulated in the antitrust cases. The court indicated that
Baylor need only "prove that the official position of the Saudi government forbade
or discouraged" non-discriminatory participation in the program, and "[t]hat
would have meant that Baylor would have to obtain an authoritativestatement of
the position of the Saudis." Id. at 533 (emphasis added). The defense, as
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vague understanding about the policies and laws of the host
government cannot sustain the foreign compulsion defense,
regardless of the reasonableness of that understanding.1 1 9 A
defendant corporation must take steps to ascertain the foreign
government's positive law in order to establish that the
discriminatory conduct was compelled by that law. 120
In addition, the foreign compulsion defense in employment
law requires the conflicting foreign law to be "basic and
fundamental to the [discriminatory conduct] and more than
merely peripheral to the overall illegal course of conduct." 12 1 In
Bryant v. International Schools System (ISS),122 plaintiffs claimed
that the hiring policies of ISS, a U.S. corporation operating in
Iran, violated Title VII because a disproportionate number of
The
married women were hired for lower paying jobs. 123
defendant corporation claimed that Iranian law prohibited
payment of certain benefits to spouses of Iranian employees who
already received those benefits,1 2 4 and that this Iranian

developed in the antitrust cases, does not recognize mere discouragement as
"actual" compulsion, nor does it accept statements by foreign governments as
proof of compulsion. The Baylor court was speaking in the context of a "bona fide
occupational qualification" (BFOQ), an approach that has been rejected by the
EEOC and the amendments to Title VII in favor of the foreign compulsion defense.
6850, at 7055 n.2
See, e.g., EEOC Decision, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH)
[hereinafter EEOC Decision] (expressing the EEOC's preference for a foreign
compulsion analysis rather than a BFOQ analysis), cited in Warner, supra note
105, at 392 n.132. Therefore, the less stringent standard articulated by the
Baylor decision in the BFOQ context is not likely to control foreign compulsion
defenses under the 1991 Act.
119. See EEOC Decision, supra note 118, at 7055 ("The extent to which an
employer must go to substantiate its belief that the person would not be allowed
to work in the foreign country will vary depending upon the facts .... However, it
is the Commission's view that the employer cannot rely upon mere conjecture
about the policies of the foreign country or upon stereotypical views of the
individual's class.").
120. Abrams, 805 F.2d at 534-35.
121. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d
Cir. 1979).
122. 502 F. Supp. 472 (D. N.J. 1980), rev'd on othergrounds, 675 F.2d 562
(3d Cir. 1982).
123. The Iranian government mandated that spouses working in Iran could
not receive certain benefits if their spouse already received them. ISS based its
hiring policy on whether a married woman was in Iran primarily to teach at the
school, or whether she was there for some independent purpose. Bryant, 502 F.
Supp. at 478-79. If an American woman was in Iran for an independent purpose,
the school assumed that she was accompanying a working spouse and offered her
a lower paying employment contract. Id. at 487. ISS failed to advise its potential
employees of this policy, thereby eliminating a woman's opportunity to establish
that she was not in Iran accompanying a working spouse. Id. The court held that
this "failure to inform" constituted a violation of Title VII because it created a
disparate impact on female workers. Id. at 490.

124.

Id.
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restriction "lies at the heart of plaintiff's claims."1 2 5 The court
recognized the foreign compulsion defense, and held that ISS was
compelled to offer fewer benefits to women whose husbands
already received such benefits.1 2 6 However, the court found that
the failure to advise employees of the Iranian law, rather than the
law itself, created the disparate impact on female employees
because they could have received the benefits by demonstrating
that they did not have spouses receiving benefits.' 2 7 Therefore,
the Iranian law compelling discriminatory conduct was peripheral
to the Title VII violation and did not constitute foreign compulsion
to discriminate. 128 The court stated that "nothing in Iranian law.
. . compelled ISS to conceal its policies,"' 2 9 and therefore the
foreign compulsion defense failed.
The EEOC has interpreted the foreign compulsion defense
somewhat more expansively. For example, an EEOC decision
declined to impose Title VII liability on a U.S. company for
refusing to hire a woman as an air traffic controller in a foreign
state.1 3 0 In so holding, the EEOC considered both the laws and
the social and religious customs of the host country.' 3 '
In
contrast to the prevailing federal court cases,' 3 2 the EEOC
accepted a letter from a "responsible official" as evidence that "the
customs and laws [of the host country] prohibit the employment
of females in all but a few categories,"133 and that "private
companies will not be permitted to disregard the laws against the
commingling of the sexes."13 4 By considering not only positive

law, but also social and religious customs supported solely by an
official letter, the EEOC decision sparks debate about the role of
"informal," as distinguished from "actual," foreign governmental
compulsion and the appropriate method of dealing with such
compulsion under the 1991 Act.

125.

Id.

126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 490-91.

129.

Id.

130.

The EEOC does not identify the parties "in order to maintain the

confidentiality of the parties to the charge, as well as the identity of the host
country."
131.
132.
133.
134.

EEOC Decision, supranote 118, at 7055 n.6.
Id.at 7053.
See infra part IlI.A.2.a.
EEOC Decision, supranote 118, at 7053.
Id. at 7054.
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a. "Actual" Foreign Compulsion
Federal courts in antitrust cases have narrowly construed the
requirement of "actual" foreign compulsion. For example, the
court in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.135 refused to
recognize foreign compulsion as a defense to antitrust liability

when "the governmental action rises no higher than mere
approval."' 3 6
In Mannington Mills, the plaintiff, a U.S.
manufacturer of flooring, brought an antitrust action against
another U.S. manufacturer, alleging fraud in securing patents
with foreign governments.1 3 7 The defendant corporation argued
that foreign patents could be granted only by affirmative
government action. Therefore, fraud in securing the patents was
immune from antitrust liability under the foreign compulsion
defense. 133 The court interpreted the defense narrowly, stating
that "fo]ne asserting the defense must establish that the foreign
decree was basic and fundamental to the alleged antitrust
behavior and more than merely peripheral to the overall illegal
course of conduct." 13 9 The court further held that "[i]t is
necessary that foreign law must have coerced the defendant into
violating [U.S.] antitrust law."140 The "defense is not available if
the defendant could have legally refused to accede to the foreign
power's wishes." 14 1 Thus, an official government decree alone is
insufficient to support the foreign compulsion defense.'

42

The

foreign law must be coercive as well as basic to the alleged
misconduct. 1" 3
In HartfordFireInsurance v. California,24 4 the Supreme Court
similarly restricted the definition of foreign compulsion. The
Court determined that British law did not compel the corporation
to violate the Sherman Act when the defendant could comply with
the directives of both the United States and Great Britain.
Although the Court did not directly address the foreign
compulsion defense, it considered whether foreign law compelled
the alleged antitrust behavior and found that it did not. 14 5 In
Hartford, the plaintiffs alleged various conspiracies in violation of
the Sherman Act against both domestic and foreign
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1293.
Id.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1294-95.
Id.
113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
Id. at 2911.
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defendants.146
The defendants argued that principles of
international comity militated against extraterritorial application
of the Sherman Act in order to avoid a conflict with British law. 147
The defendants maintained that their conduct was perfectly
consistent with British law, and argued that finding their conduct
unlawful under the Sherman Act would create a conflict. 148 In
support of this contention, the British government appeared
before the Court as amicus curiae and asserted that the conduct
at issue was perfectly legal under Parliament's comprehensive
regulatory regime. 1 49 The Court held that a foreign state's strong
policy to permit or encourage conduct does not bar the
application of United States law prohibiting the conduct. "No
conflict exists . .. 'Where a person subject to regulation by two
states can comply with the laws of both.m150
Thus, under both Hartford and Mannington Mills, mere

approval or even encouragement of conduct-even when
supported by explicit statements by the host government' 5 1-fails

the "actual" compulsion requirement of the foreign compulsion
defense. Therefore, the defense applies only when positive foreign
law, central to the otherwise illegal conduct, requires U.S.
corporations to violate U.S. law.
b. Informal Foreign Compulsion
Courts generally do not recognize "informal" foreign
governmental compulsion as sufficient to establish the foreign
compulsion defense,15 2 even though it often significantly
influences a corporation's conduct abroad.' 5 3
Many foreign
governments "operate under a system of close informal

146. Id. at 2895.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2910.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 cmt. e).
151. For several examples of courts rejecting explicit statements by host
governments to shield defendant corporations from liability, see Warner, supra
note 105, at 375-76 n.23 (citing In Re Japanese Product Antitrust Litigation, 723
F.2d 238, 315 (3d Cir. 1983) (ruling that a note from the Japanese government
supporting the claim of foreign compulsion was insufficient to establish the
defense); In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 (7th Cir. 1980)
(rejecting an amicus brief from the Canadian government as insufficient to
establish the foreign compulsion defense)). See also Stephen J. Hawes, Comment,
The Sovereign Compulsion Defense in Antitrust Actions and the Role of Statements
by Foreign Governments, 62 WASH. L. REV. 129 (1987).
152. Warner, supra note 105, at 384.
153. Id. at 385.
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In such

systems, even though governmental regulation may not rise to the
level of binding law, it is no less compelling.
Often a
multinational corporation can expect sanctions for breach of
informal understandings with the host government, the same as
for breaking formal law. 155 Notwithstanding these sanctions,
courts refuse to recognize these informal understandings as
"actual" compulsion under the foreign compulsion defense.
B. Informal Governmental Compulsion as a Shield
to Title VII Liability
Informal governmental compulsion could operate as a shield
to Title VII liability in two ways. First, courts could apply a "good
faith" standard to recognize informal customs and practices as
foreign compulsion.
Second, courts could recognize informal
compulsion under principles of international comity.
1. The "Good Faith" Standard
In one decision, the EEOC applied a "good faith" standard to

determine

whether

the

host government

compelled

the

defendant's conduct.1 5 6 The EEOC declined to impose Title VII
liability on an employer who had a good faith belief that the
otherwise prohibited conduct was compelled by the host
country.1 5 7 In order to establish such a good faith belief, "the
employer must have a current, authoritative, and factual basis for
its belief [that the laws or customs of the host country compel the
conduct], and it must rely upon that belief in good faith."15 8 This
language implies a substantially less stringent standard than the
traditional foreign compulsion defense.1 5 9
Under the EEOC
decision, mere custom of the host nation, established only by

154.
Id. at 385 (citing Griffine, A Primeron Extraterritoriality,13 INT'., BUS. L.
23, 25 (Nov. 1985)).
155.
Id. at 384-85.
156.
EEOC Decision, supranote 118, at 7054.
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
159.
The EEOC did not invoke the foreign compulsion defense explicitly,

ruling instead that the defendant corporation did not violate Title VII because the
discriminatory conduct was a unilateral act by the host government. Id. at 705455. The analysis is quite similar to traditional foreign compulsion cases with one
significant difference-in this EEOC decision, the Commission considered the

defendant corporation's "good faith" in order to determine whether the foreign
compulsion argument was a pretext for discrimination. Although traditional
foreign compulsion cases do not consider pretext separately, pretext is melded
into the understanding of compulsion. Therefore, the EEOC's language is
significant in this inquiry.
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letter from a foreign government official and relied upon in good
faith by the defendant corporation, conceivably could immunize
1 60
the defendant from Title VII liability.
1 61
has suggested that this loose
At least one commentator
interpretation of the foreign compulsion defense opens the door to
16 2
third-party preferences as a legitimate defense to liability.
Specifically, the concern is that under a good faith analysis, the
fact that competitors' businesses have discriminatory hiring
practices may form the requisite "factual basis" for the belief that
the practice is compelled by social or religious custom of the
foreign state. 16 3 The EEOC decision provides some protection
from this haphazard determination of what the host country
mandates by requiring an "authoritative" basis for the belief.'6
The third-party preference standard conflicts with the common
approach to Title VII liability. Generally, a corporation cannot
point to third-party preferences to excuse discrimination as either
a business necessity 6 5 or a "bona fide occupational qualification"

(BFOQ).1 6 6

Furthermore, mere approval or encouragement of

discriminatory conduct by foreign governments is inconsistent
167
with the notion of "compulsion" developed in federal case law.
The EEOC decision to allow a corporation to assert a good
faith belief that it would be sanctioned for failing to discriminate
in violation of Title VII arguably solves the dilemma about
informal foreign compulsion. This standard explicitly considers
social and religious customs, and credits statements by the host
government describing its national policies.' 6 8 Nevertheless, this
standard is not without its drawbacks. The good faith standard

may overstep the statutory defense by opening up the possibility
of a third-party preference defense. 169
defense
to
incorporate
compulsion

Expanding the foreign
informal
government

160. Id.
161. Warner, supranote 105, at 391 n.124.
162. Proponents of Title VII would likely hesitate to rest the statute's
application on such limited protection from pretext. Id.
163. Id. at 391-93.
164. EEOC Decision, supra note 118, at 7054.
165. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil, 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that gender is not a business necessity when customers in a foreign
nation prefer to deal with men, stating that "customer preference should not be
bootstrapped to the level of business necessity.").
166. See id. at 1277 ("The need to accommodate racially discriminatory
policies of other nations cannot be the basis of a valid BFOQ exception."); Diaz v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (being female was not
a BFOQ for job of flight attendant).
167. See suprapart III.A.2.a.
168. See, e.g., EEOC Decision, supranote 118, at 7053-54.
169. See supranotes 161-67 and accompanying text.
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compulsion may impermissibly expand its scope beyond that

intended by Congress.
2. Principles of International Comity
Principles of international comity may warrant restricting the
extraterritorial reach of a statute even when Congress has
exercised its prescriptive jurisdiction. 170 Under the doctrine of
international comity, "a court faced with the prospect of a United
States law punishing what another country requires, encourages,
or permits should analyze the contacts and interests of the two
countries and by neutral criteria select the law that is more
reasonable to apply-the law of the state whose 'interest is clearly
greater."' 17 1 Thus, international comity can be used to limit the
application of Title VII in cases of informal compulsion by foreign
nations. According to the strictures of international comity, Title
VII would apply abroad only when extraterritorial application is
reasonable.172
a. The Reasonableness Standard: A Balancing Test
The most common approach for determining whether
extraterritorial application of a statute would be "reasonable" is to
engage in a balancing test. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign

Relations Law requires the evaluation of "all relevant factors,"173
and identifies some of the factors to be considered in the balance:
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or

has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
territory [of the regulating state]; 17 4 [the] connections... between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
175
activity [or] those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
[the] character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities . . . and the desirability of such
regulation; 17 6 [the] importance of the regulation to the
international . . . system; 1 7 7 [and the] extent to 17
which
another
8

state may have an interest in regulating the activity.

170.
171.

Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2919-20 (1993).
Russell J. Weintraub, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust and

Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the "Choice-of-Laws Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1799, 1801-02 (1992).

172.
173.

Id. at 1802 & n.13.
RESrATEMENr (THIRD) § 403(2).

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. § 403(2)(a).
Id. § 403(2)(b).
Id. § 403(2)(c).
Id. § 403(2)(e).
Id. § 403(2)(g).
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After balancing the states' competing interests, the Restatement
provides that "a state should defer to the other state if that state's
179
interest is clearly greater."
Several cases involving the extraterritorial application of U.S.
laws have employed the balancing approach outlined by the
Restatement. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,180 for

example, the court recognized the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
antitrust laws, but limited the scope of extraterritorial application
with principles of international comity. 1 8 1 The court stated that
simply because "American law covers some conduct beyond this
nation's borders does not mean that it embraces all [conduct] ...
. [A]t some point the interests of the United States are too weak
and the foreign harmony incentives for restraint too strong to
justify an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction."18 2 The court
then used a balancing approach to determine the point at which
courts should defer to the foreign interest. 18 3 The court identified
three factors to consider in the balance: first ,' whether there is
some effect, actual or intended, on United States interests;
second, whether the effect is sufficiently substantial to present a
cognizable injury to the plaintiffs; and third, whether United
States interests are sufficiently strong in comparison to interests
of other nations to justify the assertion of extraterritorial
18 4

authority.
The court in

Mannington Mills endorsed the Timberlane

balancing approach to determine whether extraterritorial
prescriptive jurisdiction should be exercised.185
The court
enumerated a ten-factor balancing test l8 6 and remanded the case

179.

Id. § 403(3).

180.

549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).

181. Id. at 609.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 613.
184. Id.
185. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d
Cir. 1979).
186. Id. The factors identified by the court for consideration are:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2.
Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here
compared to that abroad;
4.

Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;

5.

Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its

foreseeability;
6.
Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises
jurisdiction and grants relief;
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with instructions to balance United States interests against the
divergent interests of the twenty-six host nations involved in the
dispute.1 8 7 Thus, principles of international comity arguably
solve the dilemma regarding informal governmental compulsion
by using a balancing test to determine when enforcement of Title
VII is appropriate. However, cases and commentators have
identified problems with the balancing approach.
b. Limitations on the Comity Analysis:
Balancing Approach

Arguments Against the

Mannington Mills highlights several arguments against using
a balancing test to limit the scope of Title VII's extraterritorial
application. First, the ten factors considered in the balance raise
"highly complex issues " 188 which some courts and commentators
18 9
argue are beyond the ability and role of the court to resolve.
19
0
Second, because the interests of each state are distinct,
a
balancing approach may yield different results for different states.
This lack of predictability leaves U.S. businesses without clear
guidelines upon which to base their business decisions, and
"present[s] powerful incentives for increased litigation on the
jurisdictional issue itself."1 9 1
Similarly, in 1984 the court in Laker Airways v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines19 rejected the balancing approach. The
Court enumerated two reasons for its decision. First, "there are
substantial limitations on the court's ability to conduct a neutral
balancing of the competing interests."19 3
Second, interest
balancing is "unlikely to achieve its goal of promoting

7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of
being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under
conflicting requirements by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if
made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Id. at 1297-98 (footnotes omitted).
187. Id. at 1298 (stating that "the interests and policies of each of the
foreign nations differ and must be balanced against our nation's legitimate
interest in regulating [the conduct]").
188. Id. at 1298.

189.

Weintraub, supra note 171, at 1817; Harold G. Maier, Interest

Balancing and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 588-95 (1983).
190.

Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1298.

191. Weintraub, supra note 171, at 1817 (quoting Zoelsch v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27,32 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
192. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

193.

Id. at 948.
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international comity."' 94 The court expressed doubt that the
judiciary "could adequately chart the competing problems and
priorities that inevitably define the scope of any nation's interest

in a legislated remedy." 195 Further, because courts find neutral
balancing of competing interests difficult, "[w]hen there is any
96
doubt, national interests will tend to be favored."'

Commentators often agree with the Laker court.

One

commentator contends that courts are an inappropriate forum for
interest balancing because their decisions are necessarily
unilateral and need not consider the importance of future
negotiations and dealings with foreign governments. 1 97 Therefore,
courts can-and often do-favor domestic law or custom and
discount the interest of the foreign nation.198 Similarly, through
the application of principles of international comity, [olur
bargaining chips will have been given away before the political
branches could use them."' 9 9 These limitations on the usefulness
of the comity approach have led to arguments both in favor of a
presumption of jurisdiction 2 ° ° and against United States
20
interference. '
3. Tipping the Scales in Favor of Domestic Law
One commentator argues for a presumption in favor of
extraterritorial jurisdiction whenever the effect of the conduct on
United States interests is "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable." 2 ° 2
This commentator contends that comity will
retard rather than advance international accommodation and
bargaining between governments, and therefore a presumption in
20 3
favor of jurisdiction is appropriate.
Another approach favors no interference by the United
States, and refuses to engage in a comity analysis when foreign
interests are repugnant to domestic public policy. 2° 4
This
approach rejects the presumption of jurisdiction on the basis of
comity. Once United States law applies abroad, the inevitable

194.

Id.

195.
196.

Id at 950.
Id. at 951.

197.
198.

Maier, supra note 189, at 591-95.
Id.

199.

Weintraub, supranote 171, at 1817.

200. Id.
201. Maier, supranote 189, at 596.
202. Weintraub, supra note 171, at 1816 (quoting the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988)).
203. Id. at 1817.
204. Id. at 1804.
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protests of foreign governments "must be dealt with at the
governmental level by changes in United States or foreign law and
by intergovernmental agreement."20 5 While acknowledging that
interest balancing should be left to the diplomatic forum, this
commentator argues that "in those instances where [exercise of

United States prescriptive jurisdiction] will inevitably lead to
requiring acts contrary to the legitimate wishes of a foreign
sovereign in its own territory, United States courts should indulge
the strong presumption that international law.., does not permit
2°
such interference." 6
A less radical approach, adopted by the Laker court, calls for
tipping the scale toward applying United States law.2 ° 7 In Laker,
the court rejected the comity analysis when enforcing foreign
interests would undermine strong public policy concerns of the
United States.2 0 8 The court stated that this principle "flows from
the right and duty of every nation to protect its own subjects
against injuries resulting from the unjust and prejudicial
influence of foreign laws." 2 9 Under the Laker analysis, a court
would not consider principles of international comity when
informal foreign compulsion results in violations of Title VII.
Such compulsion would be "unjust and prejudicial" in light of the
strong public policy behind the Act. 210 At least one commentator
has argued that equal employment opportunity is an
"international human rights goal"21 1 and, therefore, should trump
concerns for international comity. The Laker court maintained,
however, that "[niothing is more inconsistent with harmonious
international
cooperation than insistence
upon national
2 12
viewpoints under the pretense of their being international."

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 contains a clear statement of
legislative intent to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over U.S.

205.
206.

Id.
Maier, supra note 189, at 596.

207. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgium World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
208.
Id. at 937 (stating that "the obligation of comity expires when the
strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by the foreign act.").
209. Id. at 937 n. 104 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMEWARIES ON THE CONFLICr
OF LAWS 30, 32-33 (Arno Press 1972) (1834)).
210.
Id. at 937.
211.
Cohn, supranote 3, at 1292.
212.
Maier, supra note 189, at 595 (quoting Arthur Nussbaum, Rise and
Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws, 42 COLUM. L. REV.
189, 200 (1942)).
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corporations operating abroad. The extraterritorial reach of Title
VII is limited, however, by the foreign compulsion defense, which
bars Title VII liability for discriminatory acts compelled by foreign
law. Courts have further limited the foreign compulsion defense
to cases of actual foreign compulsion; mere knowledge, approval,
or encouragement of illegal activities by the host government
cannot establish the defense. To prove actual compulsion, a
corporation must actively seek to ascertain the foreign
government's positive law. In addition, that law must be coercive
and fundamental, rather than merely peripheral, to the
discriminatory conduct at issue.
The statutory defense does not recognize informal foreign
governmental compulsion, notwithstanding the profound impact
that informal policies can have on corporate behavior. To avoid
violating the laws of nations, courts should not only apply the
limitations imposed by the statute itself, but also the limitations
suggested by principles of international comity.
None of the three extreme viewpoints previously discussed-a
presumption in favor of jurisdiction, abdication of jurisdiction in
cases of conflict with foreign interests, and refusing to engage in a
comity analysis when the foreign law is contrary to strong United
States public policy-is appropriate in cases of informal foreign
Reducing the question of
compulsion to violate Title VII.
extraterritorial application of Title VII to a rigid formula ignores
the complexity of the issues. The Mannington Mills decision
correctly recognized that "the policy of each nation is not likely to
be the same,"2 13 and therefore the results of disputes over
extraterritorial application are not likely to be the same. In some
instances, a foreign government's preferences do not rise to the
level of outright compulsion. In other cases, however, violation of
even informal policies and customs can result in sanctions or
deportation. Consequently, principles of international comity
provide the best vehicle for determining foreign application of Title
VII because they require the balancing of a number of interests
designed to take into account the particular circumstances.
A U.S. corporation arranging its affairs abroad will invariably
maintain that a comity analysis in cases of informal foreign
compulsion offers no certainty upon which to base its conduct.
Corporations must be mindful, however, that comity supports
only reasonable extraterritorial application of Title VII; "when
there is any doubt, national interests will tend to be favored over

213.

Cir. 1979).

Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1289 (3d
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foreign interests."2 14 Thus, in any reasonableness inquiry the
scales are tipped in favor of national interests. 21 5 For example,
the corporation's conduct in the EEOC Decision indicated no
desire to violate Title VII.
The corporation accepted the
employment application of a woman, warned her of the possibility
that the host nation would not accept her for the position, but
proceeded to process her application as it did any other.2 16 The
EEOC found no discrimination on the part of the corporation, and
held that the host nation committed the discrimination. 2 17 In
contrast, in Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, the Baylor
officials made no attempt to ascertain the Saudi policy concerning
Jewish students participating in the exchange program. 2 18 The
court properly held that Baylor violated Title VII unilaterally by
failing to ascertain the policy of the host nation, regardless of the
actual policy of the host nation.
A United States corporation operating abroad, therefore, need
only make a concerted and genuine effort to comply with the
directives of Title VII. When the policies of a foreign state prevent
them from doing so, principles of international comity should
shield them from liability.

Mary Claire St. John

214. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 951
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